Guadalcanal
By: Brendan Leahey
Guadalcanal
I. Guadalcanal is a remote jungle island that hosted a
long and bloody campaign early in WWII.
A. Guadalcanal was the first United States (US) offensive
action after a series of defensive ones.
1. The US and Imperial Japanese (Imp) forces fought to
stalemate in May of 1942 at the Battle of Coral Sea.
2. The US won a decisive victory in June of ‘42 at the
Battle of Midway.
B. Guadalcanal was fought on a large jungle island in the
Solomon Island chain.
1. Guadalcanal is covered by “heavy tropical rainforests”
(Guadalcanal).
2. Guadalcanal has steep banked rivers and mountains over
7,000 ft.
3. Guadalcanal is far from US bases.
4. Guadalcanal sits near the “Sea Lines of Communication”
(SLOC) from Pearl to Sydney.
C. Guadalcanal was a long campaign fought by combatants
at the limit of their resources on an inhospitable island that changed the
course of United States history.
1. Guadalcanal was fought with relatively limited resources
by both sides.
2. The air and naval battles that took place surrounding
Guadalcanal had an impact on the land combat.
3. Guadalcanal was a campaign that included many separate
land battles over the course of many months.
4. Guadalcanal was the beginning of a long drive across
the Pacific that would lead to the first and only use of atomic weapons in
anger.
II. I.C.1 Guadalcanal represented the first of the developing
US offensive capability and the end of the waning Imp offensive capability.
A. The US forces were spread thin when they started their
first offensive operation.
1. The US forces could muster just 3 carriers (CV) and
one Battleship (BB) for the entire Pacific just before Guadalcanal.
2. The US force could muster elements of 6 divisions for
the whole south west pacific.
B. All Imp supplies were at least partly interdicted by
the rising US air and sea power.
1. The Imp convoys were badly mauled during the day light
and their defense led to many air and sea battles.
2. The Imp forces were forced to resort to the “Tokyo Express”.
III. I.C.2 The battles that swirled in the air and sea
around Guadalcanal were primarily fought to prevent or facilitate re supply
of ground forces.
A. The air battles over Guadalcanal were fought to protect
supplies.
1. The Imp air attacks on Lunga (Henderson) airfield tried
to prevent US interdiction attacks.
2. The growing US strength on Henderson eventually provided
air superiority and then supremacy over Guadalcanal.
B. The result of the navel battles around Guadalcanal led
directly to the supply issues of both land forces.
1. The Imp victory in the Battle of Savo Island caused
the premature withdrawal of the 1st Marine Divisions transports.
2. The Battles of the Eastern Solomons and Santa Cruz were
major fleet engagements to support Imp reinforcement attempts.
3. The 1st and 2nd Battles of Guadalcanal as well as the
Battles of Cape Esperance and Tassafaronga were all attempts by “minor” Imp
fleet units to reinforce Guadalcanal.
IV. I.C.3 The land combat on Guadalcanal consisted of many
relatively small scale battles.
A. The initial landings of the US forces were made on Tulagi,
Gavutu, and Guadalcanal.
1. Tulagi showed the first evidence of the Imp forces’
unwillingness to surrender.
2. The biggest obstacle to the Guadalcanal landings was
the mountain of supplies on the beach.
B. The early battles in Aug were small yet ferocious.
1. The 1st Battle of Matanikua involved just 1 battalion
of Marines in the first of many battles for the river.
2. The Battle of the Tenaru also involved just 1 battalion
of marines but they fought the first of many Imp reinforcements to reach
Guadalcanal.
3. August also hosted two reconnaissance patrols that met
radically different fates.
C. The battles of September showed the increasing Imp presence
on Guadalcanal.
1. The Battle of “Bloody Ridge” was the first major Imp
offensive.
2. The 3rd Battle of Matanikua was the first major marine
offensive.
D. October saw the first real large scale operations on
Guadalcanal.
1. Marine and Imp offensive met at the 4th Battle of Matanikua.
2. Imp forces launched attacks on the Lunga perimeter from
all sides.
E. In November the Marines took the initiative never to
relinquish it again.
1. The Matanikua River was finally secured in the 5th Battle
of Matanikua.
2. The Marines also eliminate an Imp force to east at Koli
point.
F. The army arrives in force to participate in the January
offensive.
1. The Marines continue to advance up the coast.
2. The army attacks dug in Imp positions on the “Galloping
Horse” and “Seahorse”.
3. The “Gifu” on the approaches of Mount Aussten is “reduced”
G. The end of January and the beginning of February saw
the end of major combat on Guadalcanal.
1. The combined Army and Marine forces pushes up the coast.
2. The Imp forces are evacuated on destroyers at night.
V. I.C.4 Guadalcanal was the first step on the long road
to victory in the pacific that would change the nation.
A. Guadalcanal foreshadowed the battles yet to come, with
names like Tarawa, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa that have become synonymous with
a stout defense by a determined defender.
1. Imp forces used destroyers and submarines to re supply.
2. Very few Imp prisoners were taken and even fewer surrendered.
3. Control of the air and sea around the island were crucial
to a successful land campaign.
B. Guadalcanal was the beginning of the US pacific counter
offensive.
1. Guadalcanal led to Macarthur’s infamous “return” to
the Philippines.
2. Guadalcanal also provided valuable experience for the
Marines that would later land on Iwo Jima and Okinawa in preparation for
the invasion of Japan that would never come.
3. The naval and air battles around Guadalcanal showed
the need for the CVs that would eventually (and still do) influence politics
the world over.
VI. Guadalcanal was a long and very important campaign.
Guadalcanal
VII. Guadalcanal is a remote jungle island that hosted
a long and bloody campaign early in WWII.
A. Guadalcanal was the first United States (US) offensive
action after a series of defensive ones.
1. The US and Imperial Japanese (Imp) forces fought to
stalemate in May of 1942 at the Battle of Coral Sea.
2. The US won a decisive victory in June of ‘42 at the
Battle of Midway.
B. Guadalcanal was fought on a large jungle island in the
Solomon Island chain.
1. Guadalcanal is covered by “heavy tropical rainforests”
(Guadalcanal).
2. Guadalcanal has steep banked rivers and mountains over
7,000 ft.
3. Guadalcanal is far from US bases.
4. Guadalcanal sits near the “Sea Lines of Communication”
(SLOC) from Pearl to Sydney.
C. Guadalcanal was a long campaign fought by combatants
at the limit of their resources on an inhospitable island that changed the
course of United States history.
1. Guadalcanal was fought with relatively limited resources
by both sides.
2. The air and naval battles that took place surrounding
Guadalcanal had an impact on the land combat.
3. Guadalcanal was a campaign that included many separate
land battles over the course of many months.
4. Guadalcanal was the beginning of a long drive across
the Pacific that would lead to the first and only use of atomic weapons in
anger.
VIII. I.C.1 Guadalcanal represented the first of the developing
US offensive capability and the end of the waning Imp offensive capability.
A. The US forces were spread thin when they started their
first offensive operation.
1. The US forces could muster just 3 carriers (CV) and
one Battleship (BB) for the entire Pacific just before Guadalcanal.
2. The US force could muster elements of 6 divisions for
the whole south west pacific.
B. All Imp supplies were at least partly interdicted by
the rising US air and sea power.
1. The Imp convoys were badly mauled during the day light
and their defense led to many air and sea battles.
2. The Imp forces were forced to resort to the “Tokyo Express”.
IX. I.C.2 The battles that swirled in the air and sea around
Guadalcanal were primarily fought to prevent or facilitate re supply of ground
forces.
A. The air battles over Guadalcanal were fought to protect
supplies.
1. The Imp air attacks on Lunga (Henderson) airfield tried
to prevent US interdiction attacks.
2. The growing US strength on Henderson eventually provided
air superiority and then supremacy over Guadalcanal.
B. The result of the navel battles around Guadalcanal led
directly to the supply issues of both land forces.
1. The Imp victory in the Battle of Savo Island caused
the premature withdrawal of the 1st Marine Divisions transports.
2. The Battles of the Eastern Solomons and Santa Cruz were
major fleet engagements to support Imp reinforcement attempts.
3. The 1st and 2nd Battles of Guadalcanal as well as the
Battles of Cape Esperance and Tassafaronga were all attempts by “minor” Imp
fleet units to reinforce Guadalcanal.
X. I.C.3 The land combat on Guadalcanal consisted of many
relatively small scale battles.
A. The initial landings of the US forces were made on Tulagi,
Gavutu, and Guadalcanal.
1. Tulagi showed the first evidence of the Imp forces’
unwillingness to surrender.
2. The biggest obstacle to the Guadalcanal landings was
the mountain of supplies on the beach.
B. The early battles in Aug were small yet ferocious.
1. The 1st Battle of Matanikua involved just 1 battalion
of Marines in the first of many battles for the river.
2. The Battle of the Tenaru also involved just 1 battalion
of marines but they fought the first of many Imp reinforcements to reach
Guadalcanal.
3. August also hosted two reconnaissance patrols that met
radically different fates.
C. The battles of September showed the increasing Imp presence
on Guadalcanal.
1. The Battle of “Bloody Ridge” was the first major Imp
offensive.
2. The 3rd Battle of Matanikua was the first major marine
offensive.
D. October saw the first real large scale operations on
Guadalcanal.
1. Marine and Imp offensive met at the 4th Battle of Matanikua.
2. Imp forces launched attacks on the Lunga perimeter from
all sides.
E. In November the Marines took the initiative never to
relinquish it again.
1. The Matanikua River was finally secured in the 5th Battle
of Matanikua.
2. The Marines also eliminate an Imp force to east at Koli
point.
F. The army arrives in force to participate in the January
offensive.
1. The Marines continue to advance up the coast.
2. The army attacks dug in Imp positions on the “Galloping
Horse” and “Seahorse”.
3. The “Gifu” on the approaches of Mount Aussten is “reduced”
G. The end of January and the beginning of February saw
the end of major combat on Guadalcanal.
1. The combined Army and Marine forces pushes up the coast.
2. The Imp forces are evacuated on destroyers at night.
XI. I.C.4 Guadalcanal was the first step on the long road
to victory in the pacific that would change the nation.
A. Guadalcanal foreshadowed the battles yet to come, with
names like Tarawa, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa that have become synonymous with
a stout defense by a determined defender.
1. Imp forces used destroyers and submarines to re supply.
2. Very few Imp prisoners were taken and even fewer surrendered.
3. Control of the air and sea around the island were crucial
to a successful land campaign.
B. Guadalcanal was the beginning of the US pacific counter
offensive.
1. Guadalcanal led to Macarthur’s infamous “return” to
the Philippines.
2. Guadalcanal also provided valuable experience for the
Marines that would later land on Iwo Jima and Okinawa in preparation for
the invasion of Japan that would never come.
3. The naval and air battles around Guadalcanal showed
the need for the CVs that would eventually (and still do) influence politics
the world over.
XII. Guadalcanal was a long and very important campaign.
Guadalcanal
Guadalcanal was the first offensive action taken by the
United States (US) in the Pacific theater of World War II (WWII). The
invasion of Guadalcanal followed closely on the heels of the two other turning
point battles, Coral Sea and Midway in May and June of 1942 respectively
(Anderson). The Battle of Coral Sea turned back an Imperial Japanese (Imp)
advance on Port Moresby leading them to land May 3rd 1942, on Tulugi, the
capital of the small British Protectorate of the Solomon Islands and its
large neighbor, Guadalcanal (McMillan 10). The force that landed was a small
detachment of the Third Kure Special landing force (10). The landslide US
victory in the Battle of Midway allowed the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) to
discuss the possibilities of an offensive amphibious operation in the central
or southwest Pacific (Anderson).
Guadalcanal is a large tropical island in the southwest
pacific that measured 90 by 25 miles (Anderson). Most of the fighting would
take place over a parcel that measured only 2 by 4 miles and contained the
now infamous Henderson field (Bergerud 6-7), named after a Marine hero aviator
of Midway (Stevenson 51). Guadalcanal was an unmapped region (Miller 43)
described alternately as “green, lush, mountainous, barley touched by civilization”
and as a place that “was a mass of slops and stinks … a place of spiders
as big as your fist and … (in which) mosquitoes come in clouds” (Steinberg
32). In more orthodox terms Guadalcanal is a typical tropical island covered
by “heavy tropical rainforests, mountains, deep ravines, swamps, heat, humidity,
heavy rains, (and) mud” (Miller 43). Guadalcanal contains mountains over
7,000 ft and the 1,514 ft Mount Austen directly overlooked the Marine perimeter
(44).
Guadalcanal was fought at the very limit of capabilities
of both the Imp and US forces. It was 500 air miles from both the Imp base
at Raboul and the US base on Espiritu Santo, while this was just another
complication for the Imp forces, for the US forces it ruled out fighter cover
without Henderson (Bergerud 25, 71). If a bomber base was established on
Guadalcanal it would make the US positions in the Fijis, Samoa, and New Caledonia
untenable, without these bases the vital Sea Lines Of Communication (SLOC)
to Australia would be severed (Steinberg 22).
Guadalcanal was a long campaign fought by combatants at
the limit of their resources on an inhospitable island that changed the course
of United States history. Guadalcanal was fought at a time when the balance
of forces in the pacific was up for grabs. The Imp forces were far from Japan
and the US who had yet to mobilize and her forces were stretched just
as thin. The air battles that took place over Guadalcanal were fought primarily
for the same reason the navel battles were, to secure their SLOC into Guadalcanal.
US forces landed on Guadalcanal on Aug 7th 1942 (Gilbert 350) and the last
Imp forces did not leave until Feb 10th 1943 (Anderson). During this time
numerous engagements would be fought, small and large, on and under the sea,
in the sky, in the sweltering jungles, on the beaches, and in the stagnant
rivers that were Guadalcanal. To reuse Sir Winston Churchill’s words about
another turning point battle in Nov 1942 (El Alamein) “Now this is not the
end. It is not even the beginning of the end. But it is, perhaps, the end
of the beginning.” A long road lay ahead for the Marines and their Army and
Navy comrades, but Guadalcanal was the first and biggest step on a road that
would end in the twin fireballs over Nagasaki and Hiroshima.
The US forces were spread thin in the summer and fall
of 1942. The US would be forced to carry most of the burden for any operation
because the Dutch were mortally wounded defending the Malay barrier (Anderson),
Britain had its hands full in Europe, and the Aussies and New Zealanders
were too busy defending the Middle East and their own countries (Steinberg
22). The covering force that would protect the Marines during the landing
at the start of the new Operation Shoestring, officially Watchtower, constituted
almost the entire Pacific fleet (Morison 166) of three carriers (CV), one
battleship (BB), nine heavy cruisers (HC), two or three Australian cruisers,
two light cruisers (LC), and numerous destroyers (DD) (Miller 34, 36). The
US could also field bits and pieces of 6 divisions but only one of them was
an amphibiously trained force (Miller 23). Despite the “Europe first” strategy
“about four times as many troops” was being sent to the pacific as to Europe
(McCullough 327). But for now this was it, the entire US strength in the
central and southwest pacific.
For the Imp forces the situation was not much better.
The Imp forces at the beginning of the battle had more than enough men, planes,
and ships, but their problems would arise in their attempts to put them on
Guadalcanal. The planes stationed at Henderson, named the Cactus Air
Force after Guadalcanal’s code name, (Bergerud 420) made it almost impossible
for the Imp forces to send transports to Guadalcanal forcing them to use
warships (579) and eventually subs to supply Guadalcanal (Wheeler 112). The
Imp SLOC to Guadalcanal was the route down “the slot” (the channel between
the parallel chains of the Solomon Islands) that would be named “the Tokyo
Express” by the Marines and “‘rat’ runs” by the Imp troops (Steinberg 33).
The air battles that would be fought over Guadalcanal
were primarily fought to protect Henderson, but both sides launched many
attacks against enemy shipping. The US also flew many Close Air Support (CAS)
sorties. Guadalcanal in the air would become a war of attrition that the
US would win.
The Imp forces launched their first air strike against the newly discovered
US fleet with an ill-conceived raid by 27 “Betty” bombers loaded with
bombs not torpedoes and escorted by 18 fighters (Bergerud 556). These aircraft
were spotted by a member of the 27 year old Australian Coast watchers who
would prove very valuable throughout the campaign (Steinberg 24). The Betty
bombers tried to bomb maneuvering ships from 12,000 ft and failed miserably
(Bergerud 556). The Bettys lost six planes with more damaged to the US loss
of ten wildcats and all without achieving a single hit (557). That same day
a force of nine “Val” dive bombers that were again inadequately armed attacked
outside their range (557). For the loss of all aircraft and six aviators
(Bergerud 557) they inflicted damage on one US DD (Miller 77). The Imp forces
launched their first and only serious raid against the landing force on Aug
8th by 23 aircraft including Bettys and fighters. For the loss of 18 Bettys,
one Zero, and 5 more damaged (Bergerud 558), they sunk one transport and
one DD (Miller 77). The Imp forces claimed they sank or damaged one BB, ten
cruisers, six DDs, and ten transports obviously far different than the actual
numbers (Peters 1). It was these raids that caused Adm. Fletcher to withdraw
his carriers, which forced Adm. Turner to withdraw the transports before
they were done unloading their supplies (McMillan 13). These were the only
major air raids against shipping launched by the Imp forces because soon
after the landing Henderson was completed and Cactus ruled the skies.
After Henderson was completed on or near Aug 20th (Steinberg 29) it was Cactus’
turn to try its hand at sinking ships. Cactus was composed of varying quantities
of SBD dive bombers, F-4F Wildcats, P-39 Air Cobras, TBM Avengers (Bergerud
421), P-400s (Miller 108), even B-26 Marauders, B-17s, and P-38 Lightings
(Bergerud 423). These aircraft came from Marine Air Wing One, United States
Navy (USN) carriers (including the USS Enterprise’s entire air wing for a
short period), several United States Army Air Force (USAAF) fighter and bombardment
wings, and even some Royal New Zealand Air Force pilots (Bergerud 420-422).
From Aug 7th to the end of November the Cactus air force succeeded in sinking
or seriously damaging one BB, six cruisers (3 HC, 1 LC, 2 others), ten DD,
and 16 transports (Bergerud 573-574, 576, 578, 580). These losses included
all 11 transports in one convoy and many warships that were wounded in night
battles, and were therefore unable to escape before daylight, which put them
at the mercy of Cactus (573-574, 576, 578, and 580). The Imp losses however
do not tell the whole story because many more transports were forced to turn
back, denying the Imp forces on Guadalcanal the supplies they desperately
needed to live and fight the growing US presence.
The Imp forces struck back at Henderson with bombing raids, many times coordinating
their attacks with bombardment by navel vessels (574). The Imp force used
Bettys flying extremely high (usually well above 20,000 ft). These raids
had very little effect on Henderson, most of the time they missed their targets
(559). The Imp forces also frequently sent a lone Betty bomber flying very
high, often with an unsynchronized propeller, to harass the Marines. The
Marines referred to them affectionately as “Washing Machine Charlie” (79).
In any large raids on Guadalcanal the Bettys were usually escorted by Zeros
flying overhead. But with the warnings from radar and Coast watchers, Cactus
was almost always able to meet the raids with F-4Fs climbing to meet the
attackers. While any other miscellaneous aircraft that happened to be on
the ground, including the P-400s and SBDs, bombed and strafed ground targets
until the danger passed (504, 560-562). By the time the US forces took the
offensive in January they had air superiority. By the end of the campaign
in February they had achieved supremacy through the slow attrition of the
dwindling Imp stocks of planes and more importantly trained experienced pilots.
The air battles were fought to facilitate control of the sea because control
of the sea was everything. The key to Guadalcanal was simple if you controlled
“Iron bottom Sound” the bay between Tulugi and Guadalcanal (Cook 12) your
troops would survive and fight if not they would perish. Before the
first shot was fired everyone knew the delicate naval parity would not survive
Guadalcanal but the question was in whose favor the gods of war would rule,
and ultimately who would win WWII.
The first surface challenge to this control took place in the early morning
hours of Aug 9th near an island from which the battle would get its name,
Savo (Morison 172-173). The Imp forces under Vice Adm. Mikawa acted swiftly
to disrupt the US landings (167) by using the night fighting capability that
they had nurtured for a long time and their long range surface launch Long
Lance torpedo (Potter 694). They sent five HCs, two LCs and a DD to attack
the Covering Force (Morison 168). The task of stopping this force would fall
to the Covering Force, commanded by Rear Adm. V.A.C. Crutchley VC and
consisting of two groups each containing three HCs (two Royal Australian
Navy HCs, and one USN HC guarding the southern approaches with three USN
HCs guarding the northern ones), two DDs, and a picket DD (Straczek). In
addition a third group of one Royal Australian Navy LC, one anti-aircraft
cruiser (CAA), and two DDs closely guarded the transports (Straczek). When
the Imp forces were sighted and mistakenly reported as seaplane tenders Rear
Adm. Turner USN called a meeting on his flagship, he asked Gen Vandergrift
and Adm. Crutchley to attend. Crutchley crucially arrived in his flagship
the HC Australia, depriving the southern force of a HC just before the battle
(McMillan 13). The Imp forces slipped by the DD pickets (Morison 173). At
0143 the message “Warning, Warning, Strange Ships Entering Harbor!” burst
across the radio waves, soon after flares were dropped silhouetting everyone
(173). Long Lance torpedoes launched earlier stuck home and the alert Imp
crews opened up at very short ranges on the shocked and disoriented Chicago
and Canberra the latter of which was rendered ineffective almost immediately
with the Chicago also badly damaged (Straczek). The Imp forces then swung
around Savo Island and in their engagement with the northern force disabled
all three cruisers (Straczek). The victorious Imp forces however did not
capitalize on their victory and withdrew without attacking the now virtually
defenseless transports (Steinberg 28). The Imp forces for the loss of just
35 men Killed In Action (KIA) and 57 men Wounded In Action (WIA) had inflicted
upon the USN one of the worst defeats in its history (Morison 176). The US
forces lost four HCs sunk (USS Quincy, USS Vincennes, USS Astoria, HMAS Canberra),
one HC damaged (USS Chicago), two DDs damaged (Straczek), 1270 KIA, and 709
WIA (Morison 177). Control of “Iron Bottom Sound” had shifted, but would
the Imp be able to capitalize before the USN could return?
Guadalcanal would force the opposing forces to use and therefore risk their
carriers. One of two major fleet engagements fought over Guadalcanal
took place on Aug 24th northeast of the Solomons (Morison 180). This time
it was the Imp forces turn to spring a trap. They baited the US forces with
a light CV, while two heavy CVs and 30+ submarines waited in ambush (179).
The US forces originally fielded three CVs but Adm. Fletcher sent the CV
Wasp to refuel just before the battle (Mueller 49). The US forces fell for
the bait and while they were attacking the light CV Ryujo the Imp planes
from their other CVs attacked, lightly damaging the CV Enterprise (Morison
181). The US forces failed to launch a counter attack (181). The battle
resulted in the loss of one light CV (Ryujo), one LC, one DD, 90 planes,
and a DD and a seaplane tender damaged (Mueller 49-50). The Imp forces damaged
the CV Enterprise, and shot down 20 planes (49-50). However soon after the
battle the Imp subs scored major victories with the sinking or damaging of
two CVs (USS Wasp, USS Saratoga), one BB (USS North Carolina), and a DD (Wheeler
112, Mueller 50). This battle forced the Imp forces to abandon day light
operations, and while the Imp CVs survived, their pool of available pilots
and planes continued to shrink.
The next major fleet engagement to be fought over Guadalcanal started on
Oct 26th again northeast of the Solomons (Morison 193). The Imp forces pitted
two light CVs and two heavy CVs against the US forces two CVs (Potter 701).
The Imp forces lost a heavy CV (Shokaku), a light CV (Zuiho), and a HC (Chikuma)
damaged plus more than 100 planes were downed (Morison 194-196). The US forces
lost one CV (USS Hornet), and one DD sunk, plus one CV (USS Enterprise),
one BB (USS South Dakota), one CAA (USS San Juan), a DD damaged and 74 planes
shot down (Steinberg 35). Again the battle was either a draw or Imp victory,
but the Imp forces were much less capable of replacing their losses, particularly
in planes and pilots.
The Imp and US forces would also fight several minor fleet engagements in
“Iron Bottom Sound”. These engagements the first of which was Savo Island
would include the Battles of Cape Esperance, Guadalcanal, and Tassafaronga.
The Battle of Cape Esperance took place on the night of Oct 11th off of Cape
Esperance (Potter 699). This battle was fought to prevent a bombardment of
Henderson. The US forces under Rear Adm. Scott consisting of two HCs, two
LCs, and five DDs (Morison 185) stumbled into a Imp force of three cruisers
and two DDs. The US force was in a perfect position to “cross the T” of the
Imp force and promptly sank the Imp cruiser Furutaka, the DD Fubuki, and
the cruiser Aoba was damaged (Potter 699). The US forces would lose one DD
sunk, plus a HC (USS Boise) and a DD damaged (Morison 187). Henderson was
not shelled but both the Imp and US forces were reinforced (187).
The next engagement was the First Battle of Guadalcanal fought on the night
of Nov 12th in “Iron Bottom Sound” (Mueller 73). This battle was also fought
against an Imp bombardment force, in this case that fact may well have saved
the US force from annihilation because the Imp BBs were caring High Explosive
(HE) instead of Armor Piercing (AP) shells (Morison 199). The Imp force under
Vice Adm. Abe (198) consisted of two BBs, one LC, and 11 DDs (Hammel 454).
The US force under Rear Adm. Callaghan (Morison 198) consisted of two HCs,
one LC, two CAAs, and eight DDs (Hammel 454). The two forces stumbled onto
each other and the battle soon descended into a melee, when dawn broke the
result was clear the Imp forces were gone but at a fearful price. For the
loss two CAAs (USS Atlanta, USS Juneau) and four DDs sunk plus the balance
of their forces damaged the US forces sank one BB (Hiei) and two DDs
(454). Two nights later on the 14th (Potter 703) the Imp forces again tried
to bombard Henderson with one BB, two HCs, two LCs, and nine DDs (Hammel
455). This time the US forces were ready with two BBs and four DDs (455).
The US forces lost three DDs and sank one Imp BB (Kirishima) and a DD (455).
After the battle of Nov 14th no Imp ship larger than a DD dared venture down
the “slot”. The last engagement fought in “Iron Bottom Sound” was the Battle
of Tassafaronga on Nov 30 (Potter 706). A superior US force of four HCs,
one LC, and six DDs was very badly mauled by an Imp force of eight DDs (Morison
208-209). The US forces suffered one HC (USS Northampton) sunk and three
(USS Pensacola, USS Minneapolis, USS New Orleans) damaged, while only inflicting
1 DD sunk on the Imp forces (Potter 706). All of the naval battles fought
around Guadalcanal were fought to secure and use SLOC to the island. The
engagements were a rude awakening for the US forces but they learned from
and eventually better the Imp forces. By the end of Nov the Imp navy was
spent although so was the USN but as always the US losses were much easier
to replace than the Imp ones.
The land combat on Guadalcanal was a series of escalating battles first fought
with companies, then battalions, then regiments, and finally the US forces
used three divisions in their final offensive. To sum up the ferocity of
the fighting and the tortures of the jungle on Guadalcanal one Marine would
write on the grave stone of a comrade a short poem :
“And when he gets to Heaven,
To Saint Peter he will tell:
One more Marine reporting, sir-
I’ve served my time in Hell” (McCullough 400)
The Marines landed on Aug 7th 1942 (Anderson). The 1st Marine division
under Maj. Gen Vandegrift which consisted of the 2nd Marine regiment (2nd
Marines), 5th Marines, 1st Marines, 11th Marine (artillery), 3rd Defense
battalion (3rd Defense), 1st Parachute battalion (1st Para), 1st Raider battalion
(1st Raider) (Miller 40) landed on Tulagi, Guadalcanal, Gavutu, Tanambogo,
and Florida islands (61). On Tulagi and Gavutu the Imp forces showed their
will to resist and take as many Marines as possible with them (62). Between
the two islands the Marines of 2nd battalion, 5th Marines (2nd/5th), 3rd/2nd,
1st Para, and 1st Raider the Marines lost 144 KIA, 194 WIA (65 and 67). The
Imp defenders lost three POW and 700 KIA (65 and 67). On Guadalcanal the
biggest obstacle to the 10,900 Marines of the 5th Marines, 1st Marine, 11th
Marines, and the 3rd Defense was the mountain of supplies on the beach and
the lack of enough men to unload the landing craft (69, 75, and 77). In classic
wartime secrecy it was reported in the New York Times that “… Naval and other
forces … attacked … in force …” (Peters 2). On Aug 8th the soon to be named
Henderson field was captured including Imp building equipment and food that
had been left behind in the Imp troops haste to escape the Marines (73).
The withdrawal of the transports put the Marines in the “most alarming position”
(81) of being “virtually a besieged garrison” (79). The Marines had just
30 days rations, little barbed wire or motor transport, or radar sets had
been brought ashore (81). However Vandegrift vowed “this will be no Bataan”
(Bradley 64).
The 1st Battle of Matanikua took place on Aug 19th (Mueller 42). The 1st
Matanikua was an offensive launched by three companies of the 5th marines
(Miller 92). While B Company made a frontal attack L and I companies outflanked
the small Imp garrison (92). The US lost four KIA and 11 WIA to the Imp loss
of 65 KIA (92). The Battle of Tenaru was fought on Aug 21st on the Ilu river
(96). The Ichiki Force composed of the 2nd/28th Infantry tried to cross the
sand bar at the mouth of the Ilu river against the 2nd/1st Marines and a
37mm anti-tank gun (97). After the initial Imp attack failed the 1st/1st
Marines counterattacked inland and surrounded and destroyed the force with
the help of two tanks that crossed the sand bar (97). The last pocket of
Imp forces had to be eliminated with a gruesome and ferocious bayonet charge
(Stevenson 52). The Marines lost 35 KIA and 75 WIA, to the Imp forces 800
KIA and 15 POW (only one surrendered) (Miller 97). On Aug 12th the Divisional
Intelligence Office led a patrol to “allow” Imp troops to surrender. The
patrol was all but annihilated and only three men survived by swimming to
sea (91). On Aug 19th another patrol killed a small group of Imp troops and
gathered valuable intelligence right before The Battle of Tenaru (Mueller
29). The high point however was on Aug 17th when Henderson was finally ready
for operations (Miller 83).
September showed the gradual escalation that would be present throughout
Guadalcanal. The Battle of “Bloody” Ridge was the first major Imp offensive
against the Marine perimeter near Lunga point. The Imp offensive was supposed
to be a coordinated attack by navel, air and two separate land forces (Miller
115). The thin Marine line across the top of the thickly covered ridge was
held by a composite battalion of the 1st Para and the 1st Raider including
two companies of Paras and three companies of Raiders (116). The Imp forces
would launch 12 attacks with two battalions during the night of Sept 13 (117).
The Marines were saved primarily by air strikes by P-400s (Bergerud 602)
and nearly 2,000 rounds fired by the 11th Marines (Miller 117). Until they
were relieved by the 2nd/5th Marines the next day the few Paras and Raiders
on Bloody Ridge were the only thing between the Imp forces and Henderson,
this was the most critical time of the land campaign on Guadalcanal (116).
While attacking Bloody Ridge the Imp forces also launched unsuccessful attacks
against the 3rd/5th Marines in the west and the 3rd/1st Marines in the east
(118). The Marines lost 31 KIA, 103 WIA, and 9 MIA to the reported Imp loss
of 633 KIA, 505 WIA, and almost all their large equipment (119). Soon after
the battle the 7th Marines arrived as reinforcement for the perimeter (120).
The first major Marine offensive was an attempt to protect Henderson from
artillery fire by securing the west bank of the Matanikua river. The 3rd
Battle of Matanikua started on Sept 26 (Miller 128). The 2nd/5th Marines
was supposed to cross the river inland while the 1st Para crossed at the
mouth and the 1st/7th landed behind the town (128). In the event neither
the 2nd/5th or the Raiders crossed the river and the 1st/7th was surrounded
by superior forces (128). The 1st/7th was saved only by the fire of the DD
Ballard which held back the Imp forces until the Marines could be evacuated
(129). The Marines lost 60 KIA and 100 WIA, Imp losses are unknown (129).
September was a trial by fire that the Marines passed and although neither
side knew it yet the worst was over the Imp forces would attack again and
again and again throughout the next two months but they would never come
as close to winning as they had on that long bloody night in Sept on Bloody
Ridge.
Both sides were preparing offensives in the Matanikua area for early Oct
but the Marines attacked first. The 4th Battle of Matanikua started on Oct
7th (Mueller 65). The Marines planned to fix the Imp forces with the 5th
Marines while the 7th Marines reinforced with the 3rd/2nd and a scout group
swung around and crossed the river inland to outflank the Imp forces and
thus win the west bank of the Matanikua and safe guard Henderson from artillery
attack (64). In the event the 5th Marines successfully reduced the Imp bridgehead
on the east bank and the 7th Marines and the scout group crossed the river
but they withdrew after fierce fighting because of the threat of an Imp attack
elsewhere on the perimeter (65). In this short but sharp action the Marines
lost 65 KIA and 125 WIA to an estimated Imp loss of 700 KIA (65). Right
before the threatened offensive the first army units arrived on Guadalcanal
in the form of the 164th Infantry regiment (164th Infantry) of the new AMERICAL
Division under Maj. Gen. Patch on Oct 13th (Anderson).
The Imp forces were planning a three pronged attack on the Lunga perimeter.
The Imp forces planned to attack across the mouth of the Matanikua river
under Maj. Gen. Sumiyoshi, across the Matanikua inland under Col. Oka, and
against Bloody Ridge under Lt. Gen Maruyama but the coordination among the
separated forces quickly dissolved into Guadalcanal’s thick jungles (Mueller
68). On Oct 21 the first Imp force attacked thinking it was part of a larger
offensive but in reality the main force would not attack for three more days
do to difficulty traveling through the jungle (68). This attack was on the
Matanikua sandbar and was led by a force of nine tanks, but the massed fire
form the 3rd/1st and 11th Marines not only destroyed all the attack Imp tanks
but also three in staging areas and most of the Imp infantry (69). The Marines
lost 25 KIA and 14 WIA to an estimated Imp loss 600 KIA and WIA (Miller 157).
On Oct 24th the main force and Col Oka’s force attacked the Marine positions
of the 1st and 2nd battalions of the 7th Marines respectively (Mueller 70).
The main Imp attack fell of the Marines near Bloody Ridge while Col Oka attack
inland near the Matanikua (70). The 1st/7th was struck at night by two regiments
of Imp infantry. when the reserve was committed it was so dark that they
could barley find their positions and were their for forced to fight intermixed
with the 1st/7th, It just so happen that the reserve was the 3rd/164th Infantry,
it was rare enough to see Army and Marines units fight side by side, but
to see Soldiers and Marines fighting intermixed was un heard of, another
first for Guadalcanal (70). The Imp forces would attack again the next night
but they would also be repulsed again, Col Oka’s attempt against the 2nd/7th
was no more successful because the Marine artillery could mass any were it
chose on the perimeter in overwhelming strength (70). The Imp forces would
lose 1,500 to 2,500 men KIA and while Marine losses are unknown the 164th
lost just 26 KIA, 52 WIA, and 4 MIA (Anderson). US firepower had won the
day as it had for a century before and has since, the “Bonzai” and “wave”
Imp attacks had been destroyed by the Marines artillery as they would on
Tarawa, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa. The Oct attacks had decimated two whole Imp
regiments while inflicting serious losses on other Imp forces on the island,
it would prove their last offensive.
Nov would bring US offensives with the newly arrived AMERICAL Division and
the battle hardened Marines to secure once and for all Henderson from artillery
attack. The US offensive to clear Matanikua was launched on Nov 5th with
the 2nd Marines (less the 3rd/2nd but plus the 1st/164th Infantry), and the
5th Marines (Mueller 75). Their was fierce fighting for the high ground
inland, but when the battle was over Imp losses were 239 KIA and the US forces
held the field which however was short of their objective (77). The reason
the Matanikua offensive was called of was because an Imp force had been landed
to the east of the perimeter near Kola Point and the newly bold US forces
could not allow it to go unmolested (77). Contact was made with the Imp force
on Nov 4th and the 2nd/7th was initially forced to withdraw, with the addition
of the 164th Infantry (less the 1st/164th Infantry) and the 2nd/7th the stack
was resumed and a large Imp rearguard was surrounded and destroyed (Miller
197). The US losses were 40 KIA and 120 WIA to the Imp loss of 450
KIA and a lot of equipment (Mueller 77). Nov was altogether a successful
month for the US forces on Guadalcanal, including the arrival of the first
units of the 2nd Marine Division and the remainder of the AMERICAL division
in preparation for the quiet month of Dec.
The quiet month of Dec during which the 25th Infantry Division and the 43rd
Infantry Division arrived and the 1st Marine Division was replaced by the
2nd Marine Division allowed the US force to prepare for a large offensive
in Jan to clear Mount Aussten and ultimately Guadalcanal. The US forces on
Guadalcanal had been formed into XIV corps under Maj. Gen. Patch (Mueller
81). The new offensive actually started on Dec 21st when the 132nd Infantry
launched attacks against the “Gifu”, an Imp position of the slopes of Mount
Aussten and on the flank of the proposed Jan offensive (Anderson). In these
intial attacks the 132nd Infantry lost 112 KIA and 268 WIA before being replaced
by the 2nd/35th Infantry (Anderson). The 2nd/35th Infantry was finally able
to quiet the Gifu with a tank attack on Jan 23 but not before they lost 64
KIA and 42 WIA Imp losses numbered well over 400 KIA (Mueller 84). With the
Gifu out of action the “Seahorse” could be tackled by the 3rd/35th Infantry,
this proved a much easier nut to crack and the battle was won in just a day
and a half (Anderson). The next objective for the 25th Infantry Division
was the “Galloping Horse”, the attack was initially launched by the 1st and
3rd battalions of the 27th Infantry but the 2nd/27th Infantry would
be needed before the battle was over(Anderson). The next phase of the
offensive occurred when the 2nd Marine Division advanced along the coastal
strip through Matanikua and beyond Point Cruz putting them in a perfect jump
off position for the attack on the last Imp base at Kokumbona (Anderson).
The Jan offensive had cost XIV Corps less than 200 KIA and 400 WIA for the
Imp loss of over 1,900 KIA (Anderson).
The final phase of the long campaign on Guadalcanal started on Jan 25th when
the Combined Army Marine (CAM) Division was formed (Mueller 86). The CAM
division was composed the 147th Infantry, 182nd Infantry, 6th Marines, and
artillery components from both the 2nd Marine Division and the AMERICAL division
(Anderson). The CAM division pushed up the coast of Guadalcanal towards Cape
Esperance on a two regiment front (Anderson) while the 2nd/132nd Infantry
landed on the other side of the cape (Mueller 87). But the Imp forces had
been evacuated from Guadalcanal by DDs on Feb 7th and thus escaped the US
trap (Mueller 88). Guadalcanal was over!
Many aspects of the Guadalcanal campaign provided experience for US troops
that would prove valuable later in the Pacific war. Guadalcanal was the first
time the Imp forces used DDs and subs to supply their troops on a besieged
island, a practice that would become commonplace later in the war. Guadalcanal
was the first jungle campaign fought by US forces, a terrain that was the
norm rather than the exception for most Pacific Islands. Very few of the
Imp force that faced the Soldiers and Marines were taken prisoner and few
of those surrendered. The ferocity of the fighting on Guadalcanal was new
to the US troops, and Guadalcanal saw the first use of flamethrowers in the
Pacific, a staple as essential as food for later campaigns. Guadalcanal also
proved that control of the air and sea around an island was essential to
be able to operate effectively on it, this would led to the massive fleets
that besieged and bombarded islands like Iwo Jima and Okinawa.
Guadalcanal was the first step in the so called “Island Hopping” campaign
that was supposed to end on Honshu. The attrition on Guadalcanal allowed
the relatively quick elimination of Raboul as a threat to Macarthur on his
return to the Philippines. After the cooperative effort on Guadalcanal the
Army and Navy would diverge to execute their separate war plans to retake
the Pacific taking with them the valuable knowledge they gained in their
six month ordeal on an unknown island in the South Pacific. While carrier
battles of Coral Sea and Midway showed their importance, Guadalcanal and
the subsequent invasions showed their ability to affect land combat to a
great extent.
Guadalcanal was one of the longest and most important campaigns the most
important war of the twentieth century. Guadalcanal was the begging of Pax
America.
Works Cited
Anderson, Charles R. “Guadalcanal” Oct 3 2003 14 pages Jan 6 2004 http://www.army.mil/CMH-py/brochures/72-8/72-8.htm
Bergerud, Eric M. Fire in the Sky. Boulder : Westview press, 2000
Bradley, James and Ron Powers. Flags of Our Fathers. New York: Bantam Books,
2000
Cook, Charles. The Battle of Cape Esperance. New York: Thomas Y Crowell Company,
1968
Gilbert, Martin. Second World War. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1989
Hammel, Eric. Guadalcanal Decision at Sea. New York: Crown Publishers, 1988
(940.54 Brooks Free Library)
McCullough, David G. World War II. New York: Bonanza, 1966
McMillan, George. “I’ve Served my time in hell” American Heritage. February
1966: 10-15
Miller, Jr, John. Guadalcanal: The first offensive. New York: BDD special
editions, 1949 (940.54 Eldredge Public Library)
Morison, Samuel Eliot. The Two-Ocean War. Boston: Little, Brown and company,
1963
Mueller, Joseph N. Guadalcanal 1942. Danbury: Grolier Educational, 1997 (940.5426
Brewster Ladies Library)
Peters, Brooks C. “Our units fight on” The New York Times. 10 august 1942:
1-2
Potter, E.B. Sea Power. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1961
Ross, Kelly L. “A Guadalcanal Chronology” 14 pages Jan 25 2004 http://www.friesian.com/history/guadal.htm
Steinberg, Rafael. Island Fighting. Alexandria: Time-life, 1978
Stevenson, Nikolai. “Four months on the front line” American Heritage October/November
1985: 49-55
Straczek, J.H. “Battle of Savo Island – Loss of HMAS Canberra” October 15
2003 3 pages January 6 2004 http://www.navy.gov.au/spc/history/general/savo.htm
Wheeler, Keith War under the Pacific. Alexandria: Time-life, 1980
Appendix A
Major Regimental Combat Teams (RCT) of US Divisions on Guadalcanal Aug 8
1942 – Jan 31 1943.
1st Marine Division
1st Marine RCT
5th Marine RCT
7th Marine RCT
2nd Marine Division
2nd Marine RCT
6th Marine RCT
8th Marine RCT
AMERICAL Division
132nd RCT
164th RCT
182nd RCT
25th Infantry Division
27th RCT
35th RCT
161st RCT
43rd Infantry Division
103rd RCT
169th RCT
Appendix B
(Ross)
Appendix C
1942: Aug 7 US landings on Guadalcanal
9 Battle of Savo Island
19 1st Battle of Matanikua
21 Battle of Tenaru River
24 Battle of Eastern Solomans
Sept 12 Battle of
Bloody Ridge
25 3rd Battle of Matanikua
Oct 7 4th Battle
of Matanikua
10 Battle of Cape Esperance
24 Battle for Henderson Field
25 Battle of Santa Cruz
Nov 5 5th Battle
of Matanikua
12 1st Naval Battle
of Guadalcanal
14 2nd Naval Battle of Guadalcanal
30 Battle of Tassafaronga
1943: Jan 13 “Galloping Horse” overrun
16 “Seahorse” overrun
22 “Gifu” overrun
Feb 7 Last Imp forces
leave Guadalcanal
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